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Abstract: While there is relatively limited disagreement on the general need for supporting the 
deployment of renewable energy sources for electricity generation (RES-E), there are diverging views 
on whether the granted support levels should be technology-neutral or technology-specific. In this 
paper we question the frequently stressed argument that technology-neutral schemes will promote 
RES-E deployment cost-effectively. A simple partial equilibrium model of the electricity sector with 
one representative investor is developed to illustrate how the cost-effective support levels to 
different RES-E technologies will be influenced when selected market failures are introduced.  We 
address market failures associated with technological development, long-term risk taking, path 
dependencies as well as various external costs, all of which drive a wedge between the private and 
the social costs of RES-E deployment. Based on these analytical findings and a review of empirical 
literature, we conclude that the relevance of these market failures is typically heterogeneous across 
different RES-E technologies. The paper ends by discussing a number of possible caveats to 
implementing cost-effective technology-specific support schemes in practice, including the role of 
various information and political economy constraints. While these considerations involve important 
challenges, neither of them suggests an unambiguous plea for technology-neutral RES support 
policies either.  
 
Keywords: Technology deployment; renewable energy sources; support schemes; cost-effectiveness.  
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1 Introduction 
To facilitate a transition towards sustainable modes of economic development, green technologies 
are needed. Compared to conventional technologies, green technologies allow attaining a certain 
level of economic development at a reduced level of resource use and environmental impacts. It is a 
major concern of environmental and energy policies to safeguard that investments in green 
technologies occur at an appropriate level. In this respect, a decisive question faced by policy-makers 
is whether to implement technology-neutral or technology-specific policy approaches to spur the 
development and deployment of green technologies (Aghion et al. 2009; Rodrik 2014). Technology-
neutral policies may refer, inter alia, to policy options pricing environmental externalities (e.g. by 
emissions taxes or emissions trading schemes) or generic subsidies to research and development 
(R&D) and/or technology deployment. In contrast, technology-specific policy approaches promote 
selected technological fields, sectors or even projects based on differentiated support levels (e.g., 
feed-in tariff schemes, specific R&D subsidies etc.). In this paper, we aim to shed light on this policy 
issue by making reference to the case of promoting electricity generation from renewable energy 
sources (RES-E). 
Virtually all EU Member States have implemented RES-E support schemes. Most of these schemes 
grant technology-specific subsidies (e.g., Kitzing et al. 2012). That is, they differentiate subsidies (per 
MWh) to RES-E plants on the basis of the energy source used, the technology employed, the size of 
the plant, or the location of the plant (or a combination of these considerations). However, 
technology-specific RES-E support has faced increasing critique. Several studies argue that such a 
policy approach makes the attainment of RES-E deployment targets more costly (Fürsch et al. 2010; 
Frontier Economics 2012; Frontier Economics and r2b 2013; Jägemann et al. 2013; Frontier 
Economics 2014; Jägemann 2014). In turn, technology-neutral approaches to RES-E support, which 
thus abstain from differentiating the support based on technology, have been praised for their cost-
effectiveness as they promote the deployment of the least costly technologies first. The 
recommendation to switch from technology-specific to technology-neutral support to increase the 
cost-effectiveness of RES-E support has also entered the guidance documents of the European 
Commission (European Commission 2013c; European Commission 2013b; European Commission 
2013a) as well as of national advisory councils (for Germany, see e.g., Monopolkommission 2011; 
Monopolkommission 2013; SVR 2014). In this paper we aim to provide a critical examination of this 
policy recommendation, and more specifically scrutinize a number of potential rationales for relying 
on technology-specific policy approaches to increase the cost-effectiveness of RES-E deployment. 
The promotion of technology-neutral RES-E support schemes rests on two important assumptions: 
(a) market failures associated with the development and diffusion of RES-E technologies are absent, 
or are properly addressed by other policies; and (b) the costs of renewables deployment beyond the 
private generation costs – e.g., system integration costs and environmental costs – are irrelevant for 
RES-E policy design because they are either homogenous across RES-E technologies or properly 
internalized by other policies. Consequently, under these assumptions RES-E technologies can be 
expected to compete among each other efficiently on the basis of their total social generation costs, 
and there would be no need for differentiating the support across these technologies in order to 
attain a certain RES-E target. Our analysis essentially addresses the question of how the cost-
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effective choice between technology-specific and technology-neutral RES-E policies can be affected 
once these assumptions are relaxed. 
To guide and illustrate our analysis, we develop and employ a simple partial equilibrium model of the 
electric power sector with one representative RES-E investor. In the benchmark case, i.e., in the 
absence of any market or policy failures, this model replicates the finding that technology-neutral 
support provides a cost-effective deployment of RES-E generation. Subsequently, however, as 
selected market and policy distortions are introduced, the model analysis reveals that technology-
specific support may perform better in terms of cost-effectiveness. We focus on different types of 
market failures. First, RES-E technology development and diffusion may be hampered by: (a) the 
knowledge spillovers related to technological learning; (b) investment uncertainties combined with 
risk aversion, capital market failures and regulatory constraints, and (c) path dependencies biasing 
innovation and development activities towards the dominating energy sources. Our modelling of 
these market failures is in part inspired by qualitative insights from the innovation system literature. 
This research emphasizes the role of RES-E policies for promoting technological development, and it 
often endorses the use of technology-specific policies given that different technologies tend to face 
unique learning processes, bottlenecks etc. (Aghion et al. 2009; Azar and Sandén 2011; Jacobsson 
and Bergek 2011). Moreover, RES-E investments may also be distorted by the presence of external 
environmental and system integration benefits and costs, whose magnitudes will often differ across 
technologies.  
For each of the above market failures we also briefly comment on some of the existing empirical 
evidence to verify whether or not the preconditions for technology-specific support are likely to be 
satisfied in practice or not. This requires both an assessment of the importance of each of the above 
market failures, as well as of the extent to which existing policies have been able to address each of 
these. Finally, the paper ends by discussing a number of potential caveats to the implementation of 
technology-specific support that may arise in practice. For instance, policy decisions on technology 
differentiation may be distorted by imperfect information as well as politico-economic constraints 
related to, among other things, distributional impacts and associated lobbying efforts of interest 
groups. Eventually, regulators therefore face the challenge of picking (wrong) winners. 
Our paper is in part related to the ongoing debate on whether climate policies, such as carbon taxes 
or emissions trading, should be complemented by RES-E policies and targets. This is in fact also a 
discussion about technology-neutral (e.g., carbon trading) versus technology-specific (e.g., RES-E 
support) policies, and about the extent to which these two policy approaches should be substitutes 
or complements (Sijm 2005; e.g., Bennear and Stavins 2007; Söderholm and Klaassen 2007; Fischer 
and Preonas 2010; Lehmann 2012; Lehmann and Gawel 2013). The research on this issue suggests 
that carbon pricing needs to be complemented with public R&D and technology deployment policies. 
RES-E support schemes may often constitute an important component of this policy mix, but we go 
beyond these analyses by asking whether these schemes should in turn differentiate across various 
RES-E technologies to promote a cost-effective deployment path over time.1 Indeed, our analysis 
                                                          
1 The choice between a generic (technology-neutral) and a more specific innovation policy is discussed also in 
Aalbers et al. (2013) and Nordhaus (2011), but in both these cases with a focus on the diversification of public 
R&D support.  
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illustrates that the potential benefits of technology-specific RES-E support schemes are in many cases 
directly related to the economic rationales for implementing RES-E deployment policies and targets 
in the first place. 
The remainder of our paper is organized as follows: Section 2 introduces the analytical model and 
discusses the benchmark case in which a technology-neutral RES-E support is found to stimulate a 
cost-effective deployment of these energy sources. Section 3 then uses this model to illustrate some 
potential benefits of technology-specific RES-E support that arise once selected market and policy 
failures are taken into account. Section 4 discusses possible caveats to getting a technology-specific 
policy design right in practice, while section 5 concludes the paper. 
2 Analytical Model and Benchmark Case 
In order to illustrate RES-E generation decisions and the corresponding policy implications for cost-
effective RES-E support design, we develop a simple partial equilibrium model with a representative 
firm in the renewable electricity sector. The model has two periods 𝑡𝑡 = (1,2). Power generation 
from renewable energy sources occurs in both periods. There is discounting at the rate 𝛿𝛿 =(1 + 𝑟𝑟)−1, with 𝛿𝛿 ∈ [0,1], between the two periods. 
In both periods the representative firm may generate renewable electricity 𝑥𝑥𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖, where superscript 𝑖𝑖 
denotes available types of RES-E technologies. For illustrative reasons, we assume that there are only 
two RES-E technologies available, i.e., 𝑖𝑖 = (𝑤𝑤,𝑝𝑝), representing wind power (𝑤𝑤) and solar 
photovoltaics (PV) (𝑝𝑝). Generation costs in period 1, i.e. 𝑐𝑐1𝑖𝑖�𝑥𝑥1𝑖𝑖�, are simply a function of the 
respective levels of electricity generation 𝑥𝑥1𝑖𝑖  (e.g., in MWh).  RES-E generation costs in period 2 are a 
function of both the generation in the same period and electricity generation in period 1: 𝑐𝑐2𝑖𝑖 �𝑥𝑥2𝑖𝑖 ,𝑥𝑥1𝑖𝑖 �. 
The costs of generating RES electricity in one period are increasing and convex in generation of the 
same period, i.e., 𝜕𝜕𝑐𝑐𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖 𝜕𝜕𝑥𝑥𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖 > 0⁄  and 𝜕𝜕2𝑐𝑐𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖/𝜕𝜕𝑥𝑥𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖2 > 0. The inter-temporal effect is incorporated to 
account for the possibility that RES-E generation in period 1 generates learning effects, i.e., tacit 
knowledge acquired through manufacturing and/or improvements in the technology as a result of 
feedback from user experiences. We therefore assume that the generation costs in period 2 are 
decreasing and convex in the generation of period 1, i.e. 𝜕𝜕𝑐𝑐2𝑖𝑖/𝜕𝜕𝑥𝑥1𝑖𝑖 < 0 and 𝜕𝜕2𝑐𝑐2𝑖𝑖/𝜕𝜕𝑥𝑥1𝑖𝑖2 > 0. We 
further assume the existence of a social planner, which aims to attain a certain RES-E target ?̅?𝑍 in 
period 2 at least total cost, 𝐶𝐶. The social planner’s optimization problem can thus be expressed as: min𝐶𝐶 = ∑ 𝑐𝑐1𝑖𝑖�𝑥𝑥1𝑖𝑖 �𝑖𝑖 + 𝛿𝛿 ∑ 𝑐𝑐2𝑖𝑖 �𝑥𝑥2𝑖𝑖 ,𝑥𝑥1𝑖𝑖 �𝑖𝑖         (1) 
subject to: 
?̅?𝑍 = ∑ 𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖 2𝑖𝑖             (2) 
This optimization problem can be rewritten using the Lagrangian approach: min Λ = ∑ 𝑐𝑐1𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 �𝑥𝑥1𝑖𝑖 � + 𝛿𝛿 ∑ 𝑐𝑐2𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 �𝑥𝑥2𝑖𝑖 ,𝑥𝑥1𝑖𝑖 � + 𝜆𝜆 ∙ �?̅?𝑍 − ∑ 𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖 2𝑖𝑖 �       (3) 
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The corresponding first-order conditions for minimizing total costs of attaining the second-period RES 
target are: 
𝑑𝑑𝑐𝑐1
𝑖𝑖
𝑑𝑑𝑥𝑥1
𝑖𝑖 = −𝛿𝛿 𝜕𝜕𝑐𝑐2𝑖𝑖𝜕𝜕𝑥𝑥1𝑖𝑖            (4) 
𝛿𝛿
𝜕𝜕𝑐𝑐2
𝑖𝑖
𝜕𝜕𝑥𝑥2
𝑖𝑖 = 𝜆𝜆            (5) 
Thus, in order to ensure that the RES target is met, the regulator introduces subsidies to both types 
of RES generation, 𝑠𝑠𝑡𝑡𝑤𝑤and 𝑠𝑠𝑡𝑡
𝑝𝑝 (per MWh) in both periods. For simplicity, we assume that this subsidy 
is a fixed feed-in tariff introduced not in addition to but instead of the market remuneration, an 
approach that exists in many EU Member States (Kitzing et al. 2012).2 The resulting optimization 
problem for the representative firm in the RES-E sector maximizing its profit 𝜋𝜋 is: max π = ∑ 𝑠𝑠1𝑖𝑖𝑥𝑥1𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 − ∑ 𝑐𝑐1𝑖𝑖�𝑥𝑥1𝑖𝑖�𝑖𝑖 + 𝛿𝛿�∑ 𝑠𝑠2𝑖𝑖 𝑥𝑥2𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 − 𝑐𝑐2 ∑ �𝑥𝑥2𝑖𝑖 , 𝑥𝑥1𝑖𝑖 �𝑖𝑖 �      (6) 
The corresponding first-order conditions for maximizing the firm’s profit are then: 
𝑑𝑑𝑐𝑐1
𝑖𝑖
𝑑𝑑𝑥𝑥1
𝑖𝑖 = 𝑠𝑠1𝑖𝑖 − 𝛿𝛿 𝜕𝜕𝑐𝑐2𝑖𝑖𝜕𝜕𝑥𝑥1𝑖𝑖            (7) 
𝜕𝜕𝑐𝑐2
𝑖𝑖
𝜕𝜕𝑥𝑥2
𝑖𝑖 = 𝑠𝑠2𝑖𝑖             (8) 
Substituting eqs. (7) and (8) into (4) and (5) reveals that in a cost-effective setting (a) no subsidies 
should be paid in period 1, i.e., 𝑠𝑠1𝑤𝑤 = 𝑠𝑠1𝑝𝑝 = 0; and (b) the subsidy paid in period 2 should be 
technology-neutral equaling the compounded shadow price on the RES target, i.e., 𝑠𝑠2𝑤𝑤 = 𝑠𝑠2𝑝𝑝 = 𝜆𝜆/𝛿𝛿. 
In this setting, firms properly account for (differences in) inter-period learning effects because they 
are perfectly aware of these effects and can fully appropriate the corresponding cost decrease in 
terms of a profit increase in period 2. 
Figure 1 illustrates the cost-effectiveness of technology-neutral RES-E support, and the excess cost of 
technology-specific support under the above assumptions. Technology-neutral RES-E support attains 
the RES-E target ?̅?𝑍 in period 2 by an optimal allocation of wind power and solar PV deployment 
(𝑥𝑥2𝑤𝑤∗,𝑥𝑥2
𝑝𝑝∗), this since it ensures that the marginal generation costs are equalized. The same target ?̅?𝑍 
could of course also be reached through the use of technology-specific RES-E subsidies. Following the 
graphical example In Figure 1, the specific subsidy to wind (𝑠𝑠2𝑤𝑤′) could be set below and the subsidy 
to solar PV (𝑠𝑠2
𝑝𝑝′) could be set above the technology-neutral rate. This is an option of technology 
differentiation existing in many EU Member States (Kitzing et al. 2012). In this specific case wind 
power deployment (𝑥𝑥2𝑤𝑤′) would be lower and solar PV deployment (𝑥𝑥2
𝑝𝑝′) higher than in the 
technology-neutral case. The marginal generation costs of these deployment levels would then vary 
across RES-E technologies, and in Figure 1 the resulting excess cost of technology-specific RES-E 
support is highlighted by the grey-shaded triangle.  
                                                          
2 Discussing a premium tariff paid in addition to the market electricity price instead of a fixed feed-in tariff 
would only partly affect our analysis. In this case, most of the arguments discussed in the following would 
similarly imply a differentiation of the premium. Yet, making the market electricity price part of the 
remuneration received by RES-E operator may internalize some of the system integration costs discussed in 
Section 3.4, to the extent these are reflected in market prices. 
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Figure 1: Excess cost of technology-specific RES-E support in period 2: benchmark case 
3 Benefits of Technology-Specific RES-E Support 
This section discusses the possible benefits of technology-specific RES-E support from a cost-
effectiveness point of view. These benefits will need to be compared to the excess costs of 
technology-specific support outlined in the previous section to decide whether or not technology 
differentiation may actually increase the cost-effectiveness of RES-E support. 
3.1 Knowledge Spillovers Related to Technology Learning 
In the basic model, it is assumed that the benefits of learning in terms of generation cost reductions 
in period 2 are purely private, i.e., they can in their entirety be appropriated by the single RES-E 
generator. However, at least a part of the new knowledge created through learning may also spill 
over to other generators, which can appropriate this knowledge at a low (or even zero) cost. Such 
learning-generated knowledge spillovers can arise due to, for instance, personnel movements and 
communication between firms, joint participation in meetings and conferences, or so-called ‘‘reverse 
engineering’’ (Argote and Epple 1990; Irwin and Klenow 1994). Certainly, patents protecting 
intellectual property rights (IPRs) may be considered a first-best approach to address the presence of 
knowledge spillovers. However, the patent system is often subject to important limitations. For 
instance, RES-E technologies typically “consist of a large set of components and require the expertise 
of several companies to improve the system. A consortium will face difficulties in sharing the costs of 
‘learning investment’, as it is difficult to negotiate and fix the allocation of future profits,” (Neuhoff 
2005, , p. 98). Moreover, IPR policies may even slow down the deployment of some RES-E 
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technologies by creating a bias towards the development of close-to-commercial technologies.3 
Under these circumstances, it may be worthwhile to consider policy options that rely on 
differentiated RES-E support schemes. 
Following Fischer and Newell (2008), knowledge spillovers related to learning can be incorporated 
into our model through a spillover rate 𝜌𝜌𝑖𝑖, with 𝜌𝜌𝑖𝑖 ∈ [0,1], which represents the reduction in period-
2 generation costs that can actually be appropriated by the firm generating the learning effect. This 
rate is allowed to be technology-specific. Correspondingly, the period-1 first-order condition (7) for 
the representative firm can now be rewritten as follows: 
𝑑𝑑𝑐𝑐1
𝑖𝑖
𝑑𝑑𝑥𝑥1
𝑖𝑖 = 𝑠𝑠1𝑖𝑖 − 𝛿𝛿𝜌𝜌𝑖𝑖 𝜕𝜕𝑐𝑐2𝑖𝑖𝜕𝜕𝑥𝑥1𝑖𝑖            (9) 
Substituting eq. (9) into (4) gives following the cost-effective subsidy in period 1 in the presence of 
knowledge spillovers related to learning: 
𝑠𝑠1
𝑖𝑖 = −𝛿𝛿�1 − 𝜌𝜌𝑖𝑖� 𝜕𝜕𝑐𝑐2𝑖𝑖
𝜕𝜕𝑥𝑥1
𝑖𝑖             (10) 
Eq. (10) illustrates that now the RES-E subsidy in period 1 is positive, reflecting the share of period-2 
generation cost reductions that cannot be appropriated by the firm generating the learning effect. 
Moreover, this subsidy needs to be technology-specific if the RES-E technologies are heterogeneous 
in terms of: (a) the degree of learning, i.e., if 𝜕𝜕𝑐𝑐2𝑤𝑤/𝜕𝜕𝑥𝑥1𝑤𝑤 ≠ 𝜕𝜕𝑐𝑐2𝑝𝑝/𝜕𝜕𝑥𝑥1𝑝𝑝; and/or (b) the degree of learning 
spillovers, i.e. if 𝜌𝜌𝑤𝑤 ≠ 𝜌𝜌𝑝𝑝.4 
These preconditions for technology-specific RES-E schemes – variations in the significance of both 
learning and knowledge spillovers – are likely to be met in practice. In fact, previous studies suggest 
that the innovation systems surrounding RES-E technologies tend to be technology-specific. The 
different technologies are exposed to fairly unique and multi-dimensional growth processes, e.g., in 
terms of bottlenecks, learning processes, the dynamics of the capital goods industries etc. (Jacobsson 
and Bergek 2011; Hoppmann et al. 2014). For instance, the technological progress of wind power has 
mostly been driven by turbine manufactures and the existence of strong home markets, while 
equipment suppliers and manufacturers that produce their own equipment have dominated solar PV 
development. This is, for instance, likely to have created different conditions for producer-user 
interactions and feedbacks, in turn influencing the presence and the magnitude of learning spillovers.  
The heterogeneity of RES-E technologies in terms of the rate of learning has also been confirmed in 
quantitative empirical work. Even though the actual level of learning rates is debatable (Nordhaus 
2014),5 there is overwhelming evidence that these rates are positive and varying across technologies 
                                                          
3 One potential reason for this is put forward by Budish et al. (2015). These authors note that while patents 
award innovating firms a certain period of market exclusitivity, the effective term may be considerably shorter 
since some firms choose to file patents at the time of discovery rather than at first sale. This implies that the 
patent system may provide meager incentives for firms to engage in learning about technologies that have a 
long time between invention and commercialization.  
4 Kverndokk and Rosendahl (2007) and Lehmann (2013) also confirm this finding in more complex modelling 
settings. 
5 Empirically it remains very difficult to separate learning-by-doing from exogenous technological change and 
economies of scale (see also, Söderholm and Sundqvist 2007). For instance, significant advances in solar PV 
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(for overviews, see IEA 2000; McDonald and Schrattenholzer 2001; Rubin et al. 2015). Table 1 
summarizes the results from a recent literature review of empirical estimates of RES-E learning rates, 
which indicate how much the generation costs decline in percentage terms with every doubling of 
cumulative production or capacity installed. Although these figures illustrate considerable 
uncertainties concerning the magnitude of the respective learning rates, they also show evidence of 
important differences across, for instance, wind power and solar PV.  
 
 Range of learning rates 
Wind (onshore) -11% - 32% 
Solar PV 10% - 53% 
Biomass 
• Biomass production 
• Biomass power generation 
 
20% - 45% 
0% - 24% 
Hydropower 0% - 21% 
Table 1: Range of learning rates reported in empirical studies. Source: Rubin et al. (2015). 
There is less empirical work, though, examining the knowledge spillovers relating specifically to lear-
ning with RES-E technologies – even though such spillovers have been found to be significant for non-
renewable energy technologies (Zimmerman 1982; Lester and McCabe 1993) and manufacturing in 
general (Argote and Epple 1990; Irwin and Klenow 1994). However, knowledge spillovers have been 
affirmed to exist and be technology-specific in the case of research and development (R&D) in RES 
technologies (Popp 2002; Braun et al. 2010; Noailly and Shestalova 2013).  
Noailly and Shestalova (2013) find that RES technologies do not only differ in the level of spillovers 
but also in the type of knowledge spillovers. They measure knowledge spillovers by counting citations 
of patents by other successive patents, assuming that more frequently cited patents have a higher 
value to society.6 This approach can be used to pick up spillovers emanating both from R&D and 
different learning processes. The authors distinguish between: (a) intra-technology spillovers 
(patents cited by other patents in the same specific RES-E technology field, e.g., wind power); (b) 
inter-technology spillovers (patents cited by patents in other renewable and non-renewable power 
technology fields); and (c) external-technology spillovers (patents cited by patents in other 
technology fields not related to electric power technologies). Our analytical model addresses the first 
of these categories.  
Table 2 provides an overview of the results presented in Noailly and Shestalova (2013). The values 
illustrate how much more or less likely a patent related to a specific RES-E technology is to be cited 
compared to an average fossil-fuel technology patent. For instance, wind power patents are 86% 
more likely to be cited in general than patents for fossil-fuel technologies. Bringing these pieces of 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
technology have resulted as a result of investments made outside the RES-E sector, such as in the semi-
conductor industry (Nemet 2006).  
6 Certainly, not all successive patent citations are external to innovating firms. In this sense, the actual market 
failure is less profound than suggested by the results reported in Noailly and Shestalova (2013). This 
notwithstanding, the figures presented clearly illustrate the heterogeneity in terms of spillovers.  
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evidence together, it seems fair to assume that knowledge spillovers may be significant with respect 
to RES-E technologies and they tend to vary across technologies. 
 
 Total 
citations 
Intra-
technology 
citations 
Inter-
technology 
citations 
External-
technology 
citations 
Wind 1.86 2.79 n.s. 0.68 
Solar PV 1.36 1.54 0.34 1.19 
Biomass n.s. n.s. 1.89 n.s. 
Geothermal 1.23 0.74 0.04 0,45 
Hydropower 0.55 0.42 2.09 0.61 
Table 2: Likelihood of RES-E technology patents cited by successive patents compared to an average fossil-fuel 
technology patent, organized by renewable energy technology and type of citation (n.s. = not statistically significant). 
Source: Noailly and Shestalova (2013). 
Finally, since RES-E technology development takes place at a global level, learning spillovers will also 
transcend across country borders. Peters et al. (2012) show that the international learning spillovers 
from solar PV production support schemes have tended to be more prevalent than the 
corresponding spillovers from public R&D. For a single country this raises the question to what extent 
the domestic economy can appropriate the learning benefits emanating from the implementation of 
national RES-E support schemes. Still, while these considerations may render difficult choices and 
trade-offs in the design of domestic policies, neither of them do suggest a strong emphasis on 
technology-neutral RES-E support. For instance, some RES-E technologies (e.g., wind power) tend to 
be more dependent on the presence of a home market than others, e.g., making possible important 
interaction between basic knowledge generation and learning-by-using etc. 
3.2 Capital Market Failures and Other Obstacles to Long-term Risk Taking 
So far, we have assumed that there is perfect foresight regarding the future benefits of investments 
in RES-E deployment in the first period. However, these benefits are a priori unclear to investors for a 
variety of uncertainties related to (Yeh and Rubin 2012; Aalbers et al. 2013; Purkus et al. 2015): 
• the degree of technological learning (also visible by the large ranges provided in Table 1), 
• the development of resource costs and energy prices, and 
• the trajectories of climate and energy policies, e.g., the CO2 allowance price emerging from the 
EU Emissions Trading Scheme and the remunerations paid under RES-E support schemes.  
If capital and insurance markets worked perfectly, private RES-E investors would be able to hedge 
against the risks resulting from these uncertainties and behave risk-neutrally – just as a public 
investor who can spread the risk across numerous tax payers (Arrow and Lind 1970). In such a case, 
an investor would be indifferent between two types of RES-E investments with different risk profiles 
as long as the expected return on investment is equal. Arrow and Lind (1970) argue, however, that 
this condition is unlikely to hold in practice because capital and insurance market failures are 
ubiquitous. Inter alia this may be due to problems of moral hazard and/or significant transaction 
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costs (the latter likely to be particularly prevalent in the case of small-scale RES-E plants). 
Consequently, private RES-E investors are typically risk-averse, inducing them to charge a risk 
premium on their capital. Moreover, the capital markets may also face difficulties in providing risk-
management instruments for immature RES-E technologies, in part due to the lack of historical data 
to assess risk.  
Again, of course, a first-best approach would directly correct the failures of capital and insurance 
markets. The feasibility of such responses may be doubtful, though. For example, the risks RES-E 
generators face could be eliminated in principle through the use of long-term contracts between final 
consumers and the owners of the power plants, but in liberalized electricity markets such practices 
are prevented due to regulations aiming at fostering retail competition (Neuhoff and De Vries 2004). 
Given such restrictions, it may make sense to consider modifications in RES-E support schemes to 
correct for these failures. 
Risk aversion has two important implications in the context of our model: First, a risk-averse private 
investor will discount future benefits of RES-E investments more strongly than a risk-neutral social 
planner, i.e., 𝑟𝑟𝑓𝑓 > 𝑟𝑟𝑠𝑠 and correspondingly 𝛿𝛿𝑓𝑓 < 𝛿𝛿𝑠𝑠 (similarly in Torvanger and Meadowcroft 2011), 
where superscripts 𝑓𝑓 and 𝑠𝑠 denote the discount rates for a private investing firm and the social 
planner, respectively. This thus provides one reason why private investors may behave excessively 
myopically from a social perspective.7 Second, a risk-averse private investor will discount riskier RES-
E investments more strongly than less risky ones, i.e., it may turn out that 𝛿𝛿𝑓𝑓𝑤𝑤 ≠ 𝛿𝛿𝑓𝑓𝑝𝑝 (see further 
below). 
While the wedge between the private and the social discount rate does not impair firms’ decisions in 
period 2, it will lead to underinvestment of private firms in RES-E deployment in period 1. This has an 
effect on the cost-effective design of the RES-E subsidy. In this case, the social and private first-order 
conditions for period 1 given in eqs. (4) and (7) must be rewritten as follows: 
𝑑𝑑𝑐𝑐1
𝑖𝑖
𝑑𝑑𝑥𝑥1
𝑖𝑖 = −𝛿𝛿𝑠𝑠 𝜕𝜕𝑐𝑐2𝑖𝑖𝜕𝜕𝑥𝑥1𝑖𝑖            (11) 
𝑑𝑑𝑐𝑐1
𝑖𝑖
𝑑𝑑𝑥𝑥1
𝑖𝑖 = 𝑠𝑠1𝑖𝑖 − 𝛿𝛿𝑓𝑓𝑖𝑖 𝜕𝜕𝑐𝑐2𝑖𝑖𝜕𝜕𝑥𝑥1𝑖𝑖            (12) 
Substituting eq. (12) into (11) yields the optimal subsidies in period 1 in the presence of myopic firm 
behavior. We have: 
𝑠𝑠1
𝑖𝑖 = �𝛿𝛿𝑓𝑓𝑖𝑖 − 𝛿𝛿𝑠𝑠� 𝜕𝜕𝑐𝑐2𝑖𝑖
𝜕𝜕𝑥𝑥1
𝑖𝑖           (13) 
Eq. (13) illustrates that, in the presence of risk aversion, a positive RES-E subsidy is necessary also in 
period 1 to compensate for the difference between privately and socially discounted future 
generation costs reductions emanating from learning. This RES-E subsidy needs to be technology-
                                                          
7 Certainly, myopic behavior may also be due to other factors such as the fact that firm managers are only 
appointed for short periods of time (e.g., 4-5 years). Stein (1989) argues that firms may be acting inefficiently 
with a bias towards short-term payoffs due to agency problems within the firm, thus suggesting myopic 
behavior also in the presence of efficient capital markets.  
11 
 
specific if: (a) learning effects differs across the RES-E technologies, i.e. if 𝜕𝜕𝑐𝑐2/𝜕𝜕𝑥𝑥1𝑤𝑤 ≠ 𝜕𝜕𝑐𝑐2/𝜕𝜕𝑥𝑥1𝑝𝑝 ; 
and/or (b) risks vary across these technologies, i.e. 𝛿𝛿𝑓𝑓𝑤𝑤 ≠ 𝛿𝛿𝑓𝑓𝑝𝑝.  
We have already shown that RES-E technologies tend to vary with respect to the magnitude of the 
learning rates. It is also likely that the perceived risks will vary with different types of RES-E 
technologies; these risks may be a function of:  
• Maturity: With more mature (i.e. more commercially viable) technologies, not only the degree 
but also the variance of possible learning effects declines (e.g., compare the ranges in the 
learning rates for hydropower and solar PV, respectively, in Table 1).  
• Technological complexity: Technologies incorporating a larger amount of technical components 
or depending on a larger variety of inputs for plant production (e.g., diverse rare earth metals for 
solar PV) or power generation (in particular biomass) are likely subject to higher overall risks. 
Moreover, the eventual impacts of a certain risk on generation costs are also a function of capital 
intensity: RES-E technologies with a higher share of upfront investment costs per unit of output 
impose higher risks on the investors (compare, e.g., biomass with wind or solar PV) (see, e.g., Fischer 
et al. 2012). For the above reasons it is likely that the preconditions for technology-specific RES-E 
support schemes in the light of uncertainty – heterogeneous learning effects and risks – may hold in 
practice.  
Interestingly, our analytical model result also implies that the necessity of technology-specific policy 
designs is more profound in the presence of RES-E support schemes that impose higher risks on 
private investors. Several studies have shown that investment risks increase when switching from 
fixed feed-in tariffs to premium schemes, tenders or quotas (Rathmann et al. 2011; Klessmann et al. 
2013; see, e.g., Kitzing 2014). For instance, while under feed-in tariff systems there is no risk in terms 
of price fluctuations, RES-E generators face price volatility under a quota system. However, in spite of 
this and thus in contrast to our above finding, existing quota systems are usually less differentiated 
technologically than feed-in tariffs. 
3.3 Path Dependencies 
Investments in RES-E technologies create path dependencies. Path dependencies emerge because 
technology choices are subsequently reinforced by positive feedback effects in technology systems, 
e.g., firms often choose to build on accumulated technology-specific knowledge in developing new or 
better-performing products and processes (Acemoglu et al. 2012). Arthur (1989) points out that 
technology choices are likely to be particularly self-reinforcing if investments are characterized by 
high upfront costs and increasing returns from technology adoption, such as scale, learning and 
network economies and adaptive preferences. Technological path dependencies may be reinforced 
by an institutional framework, which co-evolves with technologies; this is usually referred to as the 
techno-institutional complex (Unruh 2000; Geels 2004; Rohracher 2008). These institutions – e.g., 
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legal rules such as permitting procedures and informal codes of conduct – are subject to path 
dependencies themselves (North 1990).8  
In the presence of such path dependencies the cost of exploring alternative technology pathways 
steadily increases. Thus, past investments can be said to generate long-run “switching costs”, which 
will affect the economic viability of future investment decisions (Prado and Trebilcock 2009). As a 
result, a “lock-in” of incumbent technologies may arise. 
Switching costs can be incorporated into our model by assuming first that deployment of wind power 
in period 1 does not only reduce the generation costs of wind power in period 2 but also produces an 
increase in the cost of solar PV in period 2, i.e., 𝑐𝑐2
𝑝𝑝�𝑥𝑥2
𝑝𝑝,𝑥𝑥1𝑝𝑝, 𝑥𝑥1𝑤𝑤� with 𝜕𝜕𝑐𝑐2𝑝𝑝 𝜕𝜕𝑥𝑥1𝑤𝑤 > 0⁄  and 𝜕𝜕2𝑐𝑐2𝑝𝑝/𝜕𝜕𝑥𝑥1𝑤𝑤2 >0. Obviously, vice versa, solar PV deployment in period 1 may also affect the cost of wind power 
deployment in period 2 in a corresponding way. Consequently, the social planner’s first-order 
conditions for period 1 given by eq. (4) can then be rewritten as: 
𝜕𝜕𝑐𝑐1
𝑤𝑤
𝜕𝜕𝑥𝑥1
𝑤𝑤 = −𝛿𝛿 �𝜕𝜕𝑐𝑐2𝑤𝑤𝜕𝜕𝑥𝑥1𝑤𝑤 + 𝜕𝜕𝑐𝑐2𝑝𝑝𝜕𝜕𝑥𝑥1𝑤𝑤�          (14) 
𝜕𝜕𝑐𝑐1
𝑝𝑝
𝜕𝜕𝑥𝑥1
𝑝𝑝 = −𝛿𝛿 �𝜕𝜕𝑐𝑐2𝑝𝑝𝜕𝜕𝑥𝑥1𝑝𝑝 + 𝜕𝜕𝑐𝑐2𝑤𝑤𝜕𝜕𝑥𝑥1𝑝𝑝�           (15) 
If multiple firms invest in RES-E deployment simultaneously, the path dependencies created by single 
investment decisions are unlikely to be considered by the investing firm. Thus, the switching costs 
that arise from technology deployment constitute an external cost; e.g., if the period-1 power 
generators invest in wind power-specific human, institutional and physical capital, this will lower the 
pay-off of directing period-2 activities towards solar PV that (at least in part) cannot make use of this 
capital. Consequently, the private first-order conditions for the RES-E investor in period 1 remain 
unchanged as in eq. (7). Substituting eqs. (14) and (15) into (7) yields the cost-effective subsidy for 
each RES-E technology:  
𝑠𝑠1
𝑤𝑤 = −𝛿𝛿 𝜕𝜕𝑐𝑐2𝑝𝑝
𝜕𝜕𝑥𝑥1
𝑤𝑤            (16) 
𝑠𝑠1
𝑝𝑝 = −𝛿𝛿 𝜕𝜕𝑐𝑐2𝑤𝑤
𝜕𝜕𝑥𝑥1
𝑝𝑝            (17) 
Eqs. (16) and (17) show that the existence of path dependencies requires a negative RES-E subsidy, or 
a markdown to the subsidy, in period 1 to address the external switching costs generated by 
investments into specific RES-E technologies. A simple example illustrates that this markdown may 
vary across RES-E technologies. Assume that: (a) wind power deployment in period 1 is higher than 
solar PV deployment (𝑥𝑥1𝑤𝑤 > 𝑥𝑥1𝑝𝑝) because the marginal costs of wind power deployment are lower 
(𝑑𝑑𝑐𝑐1𝑤𝑤 𝑑𝑑𝑥𝑥1𝑤𝑤⁄ < 𝑑𝑑𝑐𝑐1𝑝𝑝 𝑑𝑑𝑥𝑥1𝑝𝑝� ); and (b) the slope of the marginal switching cost curves produced by either 
                                                          
8 Differences in terms of ownership and traditions may affect future pathways. For instance, in his assessment 
of the electricity regimes in the Nordic countries, Thue (1995) notes that while the Danish electricity system has 
largely been organized in a bottom-up manner with cooperative organizations and municipalities as owners of 
power stations, the Swedish system has been more hierarchical. The latter led to a relative lack of experience 
of investment in small-scale plants in Sweden, and instead a focus on large state-supported hydropower and 
nuclear energy. During the 1990s this contributed to a relative lack of Swedish interest in wind power, while 
the tradition of local ownership enabled high level of penetration of small-scale wind power in Denmark.  
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technology in period 2 is equal for both RES-E technologies (𝜕𝜕2𝑐𝑐2
𝑝𝑝/𝜕𝜕𝑥𝑥1𝑤𝑤2 = 𝜕𝜕2𝑐𝑐2𝑤𝑤/𝜕𝜕𝑥𝑥1𝑝𝑝2 > 0). Under 
these assumptions, the marginal switching costs produced by wind power deployment and affecting 
solar PV will be higher than the corresponding effect from solar PV deployment (𝜕𝜕𝑐𝑐2
𝑝𝑝 𝜕𝜕𝑥𝑥1
𝑤𝑤⁄ >
𝜕𝜕𝑐𝑐2
𝑤𝑤 𝜕𝜕𝑥𝑥1
𝑝𝑝⁄ ). Thus, in this example the markdown to the RES-E subsidy needs to be higher for wind 
power than for solar PV, thus providing an additional rationale for the use of technology-specific RES-
E support.  
It is frequently pointed out that the power sector exhibits several characteristics, which are likely to 
produce strong path dependencies (see, e.g., Grubb 1997; Unruh 2000; Neuhoff 2005; Kalkuhl et al. 
2012; Lehmann et al. 2012). Investments in this sector are large-scale, long-term and exhibit 
increasing returns from technology adoption. Technological path dependencies are aggravated by 
the fact that power outputs from different types of technologies are almost perfect substitutes. That 
is, emerging power technologies can only compete on price with incumbent ones, and thus with little 
scope for product differentiation. Moreover, the power sector is highly regulated, implying that 
existing technological patterns of power generation are embedded into and enforced by a complex 
set of institutions (see above).  
The empirical significance of these characteristics is likely to differ across RES-E technologies. For 
instance, investments in new RES-E capacity are generally capital-intensive, and since the investment 
costs of existing plants are sunk this capacity will compete with new capacity on the basis of their 
variable costs. The greater the difference between the total cost of a new plant and the variable cost 
of an existing plant, the greater is the incentive for a more intense use of existing capacity through 
higher capacity utilization, life time extensions, and incremental capacity additions (e.g., Söderholm 
2001). Some new RES-E technologies are likely to be more aligned with existing institutions than 
others, thus lowering the cost of new plants. For example, spatial planning law may discriminate 
between different types of RES-E technologies.9 In addition, for some technologies increases in RES-E 
generation within existing technologies, e.g., co-firing with biomass in combined heat and power 
plants, are easier than for others. 
As indicated above, path dependencies are not only related to investments into power generation 
capacity but also to the direction of technological change (Acemoglu et al. 2012; Aghion et al. 2012).  
Such path dependencies have been used to explain the competitive advantage of fossil-fuel over RES-
E technologies (“carbon lock-in”), and to derive a general rationale for implementing RES-E policies in 
addition to emission policies. Similarly, path dependencies may also distort the allocation of R&D 
investments across different RES-E technologies (Kverndokk et al. 2004). Some empirical evidence is 
available for path dependency in the direction of technological change with RES-E technologies. One 
indication is provided by the results reported in Table 2, which points to the fact that present R&D 
activities for a specific RES-E technology tend to be strongly driven by past R&D in the same 
technology field (see also Popp 2002). This appears to be particularly evident for wind power and 
solar PV. Another piece of evidence is provided by studies comparing the innovation effects for 
technology-neutral and technology-specific RES-E support schemes, respectively. Using patent counts 
                                                          
9 See, for example, §35 of the German Building Code, which privileges the use of wind power and bioenergy; 
corresponding plants can be installed in areas for which no formal development plan exists, i.e. in areas where 
other types of developments are ruled out. 
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data, Johnstone et al. (2010) and Bäckström et al. (2014) show that technology-neutral RES-E policies 
are more likely to induce technological change for close-to-commercial technologies, such as wind 
power, which are primarily promoted under such schemes. In contrast, technology-specific RES-E 
policies are required to induce innovation in the case of more costly, emerging technologies, such as 
solar PV. This may be understood as an indication of existing path dependencies, even though it may 
also be attributable to other factors, such as differences in the allocation of risks under the different 
policies. Overall, it thus seems plausible to assume that path dependencies may also impair choices 
between RES-E technologies, and should therefore be considered in designing technology-specific 
RES-E policies. 
3.4 External Costs of RES-E Generation 
Next to the private generation costs, RES-E deployment may also produce additional costs that may 
be inadequately internalized through other policy measures (e.g., taxes, standards etc.). First, RES-E 
plant installation and operation as well as the production of bioenergy crops bring about 
environmental costs (Abbasi and Abbasi 2000; Sathaye et al. 2011). These costs may be (a) site-
specific, regarding impacts on ecosystem services and biodiversity due to habitat destruction and 
fragmentation, and water and air pollution; and/or (b) related to the distance of a site to human 
settlements, regarding impacts of landscape changes, air pollution or noise emissions. In addition, 
the pollution avoided by marginal increases in RES-E generation may also differ across technologies, 
thus giving rise to heterogeneous marginal external benefits (e.g., Kaffine et al. 2013). Second, 
additional costs are also associated with the integration of RES-E in-feed to the power system. Hirth 
et al. (2015) distinguish between three types of system integration costs produced by RES-E 
deployment: (a) balancing costs (the marginal costs of coping with deviations from day-ahead 
generation schedules due to forecast errors for intermittent RES-E sources); (b) grid-related costs 
(marginal costs of transmission constraints and losses due to the location of RES-E generation in the 
power grid); and (c) profile costs (marginal cost of output adjustments and an overall reduced 
utilization of convention thermal power plants due to the timing of variable RES-E generation). 
These diverse cost categories may at least in part be external to the single firm, i.e., not included in 
𝑐𝑐𝑡𝑡
𝑖𝑖. To illustrate this, we incorporate external costs 𝑒𝑒𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖�𝑥𝑥𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖� into our model for both periods. We do not 
here explicitly consider the possible impacts of avoided environmental impacts following any decline 
in non-RES-E deployment, although much of the general arguments made below will be valid also for 
this case. The external costs are assumed to be increasing and convex in RES-E generation, i.e. 
𝑑𝑑𝑒𝑒𝑡𝑡
𝑖𝑖 𝑑𝑑𝑥𝑥𝑡𝑡
𝑖𝑖 > 0⁄  and 𝑑𝑑2𝑒𝑒𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖/𝑑𝑑𝑥𝑥𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖2 > 0. The first-order conditions for the social optimum in eqs. (4) and (5) 
are consequently modified as: 
𝑑𝑑𝑐𝑐1
𝑖𝑖
𝑑𝑑𝑥𝑥1
𝑖𝑖 = −𝛿𝛿 𝜕𝜕𝑐𝑐2𝑖𝑖𝜕𝜕𝑥𝑥1𝑖𝑖 − 𝑑𝑑𝑒𝑒1𝑖𝑖𝑑𝑑𝑥𝑥1𝑖𝑖           (18) 
𝛿𝛿
𝜕𝜕𝑐𝑐2
𝑖𝑖
𝜕𝜕𝑥𝑥2
𝑖𝑖 = 𝜆𝜆 − 𝑑𝑑𝑒𝑒2𝑖𝑖𝑑𝑑𝑥𝑥2𝑖𝑖            (19) 
Obviously, these external costs could be internalized efficiently by, for instance, a Pigovian tax on 
emissions. However, such first-best policies may not be available for a variety of reasons (see also 
below). In this case, modifications in the RES-E subsidy design may be one available means of 
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addressing the externalities of RES-E deployment. Substituting eqs. (7) and (8) into (18) and (19), 
respectively, gives the following cost-effective RES-E subsidies in the presence of external costs: 
𝑠𝑠1
𝑖𝑖 = − 𝑑𝑑𝑒𝑒1𝑖𝑖
𝑑𝑑𝑥𝑥1
𝑖𝑖             (20) 
𝑠𝑠2
𝑖𝑖 = 1
𝛿𝛿
�𝜆𝜆 −
𝑑𝑑𝑒𝑒2
𝑖𝑖
𝑑𝑑𝑥𝑥2
𝑖𝑖 �           (21) 
Eqs. (20) and (21) illustrate that the cost-effective subsidy is negative, i.e., a tax or a markdown to the 
subsidy in period 1, and below the shadow price on the RES-E target in period two to compensate for 
the external costs. Moreover, the subsidy needs to be technology-specific if the external costs vary 
across technologies, i.e., if 𝑑𝑑𝑒𝑒𝑡𝑡𝑤𝑤/𝑑𝑑𝑥𝑥𝑡𝑡𝑤𝑤 ≠ 𝑑𝑑𝑒𝑒𝑡𝑡𝑝𝑝/𝑑𝑑𝑥𝑥𝑡𝑡𝑝𝑝. Of course, if the external costs of non-RES-E 
generation is also taken into account this technology differentiation should also reflect the potential 
heterogeneity in avoided impacts (Novan 2015).  
It is obvious that the environmental and system integration costs of RES-E deployment will vary 
significantly across technologies (by RES-E type) as well as within technologies (by RES-E plant 
location and design). Table 3 provides illustrative examples. Obviously, any attempt to assess the cost 
differential between RES-E technologies empirically and in monetary terms faces significant 
restrictions. It is subject to diverse uncertainties and general limitations of economic valuation and 
hinges crucially on the technological assumptions for either technology or the cost categories and 
stages in the life cycle considered. It may also be difficult to determine the extent to which these 
costs are already internalized.  
These limitations notwithstanding, some general indications on external cost differences can be 
detected. In their survey of the literature estimating the environmental external costs of power 
generation Söderholm and Sundqvist (2006) report that these costs tend on average to be higher for 
biomass generation than for both wind power and solar PV, although this review also identifies 
substantial variance in the cost estimates. Important differences typically exist also in the case of 
avoided air pollution. For instance, Novan (2015) shows that in the Texas electricity market an 
increase in wind power generation will offset more carbon dioxide emissions than output from solar 
PV plants and this difference increases as the installed capacity grows. Turning to the system 
integration costs this is clearly a more important issue for intermittent RES-E generation, such as 
wind power or solar PV, as compared to, for instance, biomass (see Table 3). 
Obviously, the categories of environmental and system integration costs referred to in Table 3 are 
not by definition fully external to RES-E investors – and even if they were,  technology-specific RES-E 
support would not be the first-best response to correct for these externalities. Environmental costs 
can be internalized by direct taxes on environmental harmful activities such as air pollution. They 
may also be addressed by command-and-control regulations, such as performance standards and/or 
land use planning. Furthermore, system integration costs are imposed on RES-E investors if: (a) RES-E 
remuneration reflects market prices, as under a premium tariff; and/or if (b) the temporal and spatial 
variation of the market value of electric power is properly reflected in spot, future and balance 
markets (Löschel et al. 2013; Hirth et al. 2015). However, the institutional framework may often fail 
to internalize these costs properly. For example, the system integration costs of RES-E deployment 
are currently not fully imposed on investors: fixed feed-in tariffs are used instead of premium tariffs. 
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Power markets fail to send improper investment signals due to the design and timing of the contracts 
traded, the absence of locational price signals, regulatory uncertainty or market power (Hirth et al. 
2015). Obviously, the correction of these institutional failures would be the first-best response to 
directly internalize such system integration costs. However, this may not be possible because – and 
actually institutional failures may be the result of – a lacking political will and/or significant 
administrative costs and legal hurdles (Löschel et al. 2013), or simply because some costs may be 
produced outside the administrative area under consideration. Under these conditions, the 
differentiation of support schemes across (as well as within) different RES-E technologies may be a 
politically feasible option.  
 
 Environmental costs System integration costs 
RES type • Different relevant categories of costs, 
e.g. biomass-specific impacts of 
growing, transporting and burning 
energy crops (Miyake et al. 2012) 
• Different levels of costs, e.g., landscape 
impacts higher for wind power than for 
solar PV and biomass (Dobers et al. 
2015) 
• Generally, higher for intermittent 
RES-E technologies (i.e., wind, solar 
PV) 
• Profile costs higher for solar PV than 
for wind power because daily solar 
radiation is concentrated in few hours 
(Hirth 2013) 
• Balancing costs lower for solar PV 
than for wind power due to fewer 
forecast errors (Hirth 2013) 
• Depending on RES-E mix, e.g., 
aggregated profile costs lower with 
equal shares of wind power and solar 
PV (Tafarte et al. 2014) 
RES plant 
location 
• Increasing with higher ecological 
sensitivity of the site (Drechsler et al. 
2010) 
• Landscape impacts increasing with 
declining distance to human 
settlements (Drechsler et al. 2010; 
Meyerhoff et al. 2010) 
• Profile costs lower with a more even 
spatial distribution of RES-E plants 
(geographical smoothening of RES-E 
plants) (Hirth et al. 2015) 
• Profile costs lower for offshore wind 
power than for onshore installations 
(Hirth et al. 2015) 
• Lower grid-related costs for RES-E 
plants closer to load centers (Hirth et 
al. 2015) 
RES plant 
design 
• Landscape impacts increasing with 
height of wind turbines/size of wind 
parks (Bergmann et al. 2008; 
Meyerhoff et al. 2010) 
• Decreasing with advanced, more 
system-friendly plant design, e.g. PV 
modules oriented to east and west, 
weak-wind turbines (Hirth and 
Mueller 2015) 
Table 3: Heterogeneity in environmental and system integration costs by RES-E type, plant location and plant design.  
3.5 Interim Conclusion 
Table 4 provides a summary of the cost-effective RES-E subsidy levels derived in the previous sub-
sections. For each category of market failure, the subsidy needs to be designed to reflect the wedge 
that exists between the private marginal generation costs of RES-E deployment and the 
corresponding social costs.  
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 Cost-effective RES-E subsidy 
Assumptions Period 1 Period 2 
No market and policy failures 
(benchmark case) 
0 
𝜆𝜆
𝛿𝛿
 
Knowledge spillovers −𝛿𝛿�1 − 𝜌𝜌𝑖𝑖� 𝜕𝜕𝑐𝑐2𝑖𝑖
𝜕𝜕𝑥𝑥1
𝑖𝑖  
Uncertainty, capital market 
failures, risk aversion 
�𝛿𝛿𝑓𝑓𝑖𝑖 − 𝛿𝛿𝑠𝑠�
𝜕𝜕𝑐𝑐2
𝑖𝑖
𝜕𝜕𝑥𝑥1
𝑖𝑖  
Path dependencies −𝛿𝛿 𝜕𝜕𝑐𝑐2
𝑝𝑝
𝜕𝜕𝑥𝑥1
𝑤𝑤 and −𝛿𝛿
𝜕𝜕𝑐𝑐2
𝑤𝑤
𝜕𝜕𝑥𝑥1
𝑝𝑝 
External costs −
𝑑𝑑𝑒𝑒1
𝑖𝑖
𝑑𝑑𝑥𝑥1
𝑖𝑖  
1
𝛿𝛿
�𝜆𝜆 −
𝑑𝑑𝑒𝑒2
𝑖𝑖
𝑑𝑑𝑥𝑥2
𝑖𝑖 � 
Grey-shaded areas highlight potentially necessary technology-specific RES subsidies 
Table 4: Summary of analytical results 
This wedge may be negative for some market failures, i.e. the social costs may be lower than the 
private generation costs. This holds true in the case of positive learning externalities as well as for 
uncertainty combined with capital market failures (the latter leading to excessive discounting by 
private investors). The wedge will instead be positive for some other market failures, i.e. the social 
costs may be above the private generation costs. This is the case in the presence of path 
dependencies (generating external switching costs) as well as external environmental and system 
integration costs. Importantly, our discussion of either case of market failure has demonstrated that 
the size of the wedge is likely to be technology-specific in most cases. Consequently, technology-
specific RES-E subsidy rates are needed to address the relevant market failures. 
The policy implications of the wedge driven between private and social costs of RES-E deployment by 
the diverse market failures are also illustrated in Figure 2, which extends upon the benchmark case 
displayed in Figure 1. For the sake of generality, we represent this wedge as Δ𝑖𝑖 and abstain from 
using the time subscript (given the fact that the wedge may be produced within one time period as 
well as between periods). Next to private generation costs Figure 2 also depicts the social costs, i.e. 
the sum of generation costs plus a wedge (𝜕𝜕𝑐𝑐𝑖𝑖 𝜕𝜕𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖⁄ + Δ𝑖𝑖, the dashed lines).  
In this example, we assume that the wedge is positive and lower for wind power than for solar PV 
deployment. This may hold true, for example, for external environmental costs. In this case, the cost-
effective allocation of deployment to attain a given RES-E target (𝑥𝑥𝑤𝑤∗,𝑥𝑥𝑝𝑝∗) deviates from that in the 
benchmark case with generation costs only (𝑥𝑥𝑤𝑤′,𝑥𝑥𝑝𝑝′). The cost-effective level of wind power (solar 
PV) deployment is higher (lower) than in the benchmark case because it exhibits a smaller (larger) 
positive wedge than solar PV (wind power). If the RES-E support scheme is to correct for the wedge, 
these cost-effective deployment levels can only be attained through the use of technology-specific 
RES-E subsidy rates (𝑠𝑠𝑤𝑤,𝑠𝑠𝑝𝑝). A technology-neutral RES-E subsidy (𝑠𝑠𝑤𝑤′ = 𝑠𝑠𝑝𝑝′), as in the benchmark 
case, would produce an excess cost (see the grey-shaded triangle in Figure 2). Notably, Figure 2 
illustrates that the technology-specific subsidy to wind power is higher than in the benchmark case – 
even though a positive wedge would imply a markdown to the subsidy rate (see, e.g., eq. (21)). This is 
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because the shadow price 𝜆𝜆 of the RES-E target ?̅?𝑍 is higher than in the benchmark case if the social 
costs of RES-E deployment exceed private generation costs. 
 
Figure 2: Excess cost of technology-neutral RES-E support with external costs in period 2.  
By the discussion of benefits of technology-specific RES-E support schemes so far we do not mean to 
suggest that designing and implementing such schemes cost-effectively is a straightforward exercise. 
To the contrary, we have shown that the actual size of the wedge will be uncertain. Moreover, the 
arguments we have so far discussed in isolation need to be merged to provide an aggregate 
assessment of cost-effective technology differentiation. In this context, potential trade-offs between 
addressing different rationales for technology differentiation have to be considered. For example, 
some rationales may point to a relatively high level of support to solar PV (e.g., knowledge spillovers, 
uncertainty etc.) while others may call for a lower level (e.g., system integration costs). What is more, 
the different rationales for technology-specific RES-E support may also interact. For example, the 
welfare loss from imperfectly addressed learning spillovers or external costs as well as capital market 
failures may be aggravated in the presence of technological and institutional path dependencies. 
These challenges lead over to potential practical caveats to implementing technology-specific RES-E 
support cost-effectively.  
4 Potential Caveats to Technology-Specific RES-E Support 
So far, we have discussed the potential benefits of technology-specific RES-E support schemes. 
Certainly, technology differentiation may also give rise to government failures. Notably, the proper 
design and implementation of technology-specific policies may be impaired because regulators face 
significant information constraints, and/or because their decisions may also be driven by politico-
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economic considerations (Rodrik 2014). Given the fact that investment decisions in the power sector 
tend to be strongly path dependent, such distortions may result in governments “picking the wrong 
winners” by relying on technology differentiation. These challenges will be discussed critically in the 
following. 
4.1 Regulation under Asymmetric Information  
The design of technology-specific support schemes is quite demanding in terms of information – with 
respect to both the relevance of individual rationales as well as their aggregation. As the theoretical 
analysis has demonstrated, a proper design requires information on current technology costs, 
technology learning rates and any related knowledge spillovers, investment risks, path dependencies 
as well as environmental and system externalities, and suitable technological responses to address 
these.  
At least some of the needed information may be more easily accessible to private investors than to a 
central regulator, e.g., information on current and future technology costs and/or suitable pollution 
abatement technology. Due to these information asymmetries, a regulator may fail to design 
technology-specific schemes properly – a critique that has been raised with respect to RES-E support 
in particular (Frontier Economics and r2b 2013; Monopolkommission 2013; del Rio and Cerdá 2014; 
Frontier Economics 2014; SVR 2014) and government intervention in general (Lerner 2009). In this 
respect, technology-neutral schemes may be superior because they require fewer policy design 
decisions (in theory, only the determination of one uniform price or quota for all RES-E generation 
sources). Thus, one would eventually have to balance the potential benefits from technology 
differentiation against the potential welfare losses from implementing policies that are sub-optimally 
designed because of information constraints. 
Notably, however, technology-specific RES-E support schemes can also be designed to reveal private 
information by including auctions. Certainly, auctions only make sense for moderate degrees of 
technology differentiation (e.g., across but not within RES technologies) because they require a 
certain quantity of bidders (del Rio and Linares 2014). In addition, asymmetric information can be 
addressed by facilitating policy learning over time, e.g., by installing a preset monitoring and revision 
process for RES-E support schemes that allow for policy reforms once new information becomes 
available to the regulator (Foxon and Pearson 2008; Rodrik 2014). Eventually, asymmetric 
information may therefore not question technology-specific support in general but rather call for a 
careful assessment of the feasible depth and temporal flexibility of technology differentiation. 
Moreover, it is important to emphasize that information constraints faced by a regulator may also be 
due to general uncertainties, regarding for example the expected degree of technological learning for 
different technologies. These constraints will also impair private investors’ decision, and cannot serve 
as an argument against technology differentiation. The main implication is rather that governments 
should avoid supporting “single winners”, and instead provide support schemes for several emerging 
technologies (that are not perfect substitutes) to reduce uncertainties (Azar and Sandén 2011; 
Aalbers et al. 2013). However, such a portfolio approach to RES-E support does not in any way 
preclude technology differentiation. In the light of the uncertainties about the future prospects for 
RES-E generation some technologies sometimes labeled backstop technologies may deserve 
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preferential treatment (Fischer et al. 2012). A true backstop technology is available in more or less 
unlimited quantities at some given cost, and for this reason it may assist in putting a cap on the cost 
of reaching strict emission reduction targets, i.e., it represents an insurance against high costs. Some 
RES-E technologies are more likely to exhibit important backstop characteristics than other; e.g., 
compared to biomass the scarcity constraints are likely to be less prevalent in the case of solar PV 
since the flow of solar energy to earth is abundant and solar panels can be placed on roofs. 
Technology-specific support schemes that can bring down the cost of solar PV can therefore have an 
added insurance value. 
4.2 Political Economy of Regulation 
A second caveat to technology-specific RES support (and indeed regulation in general) is that political 
decisions concerning the degree of technology differentiation may not only be driven by cost-
effectiveness motivations but also by other policy criteria as well as by the self-interests of political 
actors and key stakeholders (for an overview, see Strunz et al. 2015).  
One important motivation behind implementing technology-specific RES-E support schemes may be 
distributional concerns. In particular, surcharges on electricity prices to fund RES-E subsidies may 
impose a substantial financial burden on electricity consumers. It is shown in the literature that 
technology-specific RES-E support schemes may decrease final consumer costs (i.e., the sum of 
generation costs and producer rents) basically because price discrimination across technologies with 
different costs may help to reap producer rents (e.g., Jacobsson et al. 2009; Bergek and Jacobsson 
2010; del Rio and Cerdá 2014; Held et al. 2014; Hitaj et al. 2014; Resch et al. 2014). From a politico-
economic perspective this redistribution of income from power producers to consumers may be 
motivated by political concerns about the public acceptance of RES-E deployment and potentially lost 
votes for upcoming elections. 
Moreover, it is often argued that technology-specific policies are more prone to regulatory capture 
by different political interest groups than technology-neutral ones (Lerner 2009; Aalbers et al. 2013; 
SVR 2014). According to Helm (2010), technology differentiation opens up avenues for a “renewable 
pork barrel”, i.e., lobbyists of different RES-E technologies may be able to simultaneously satisfy their 
potentially heterogeneous interests and maximize their individual rents by promoting technology-
specific subsidy rates. Lobbyists may also be more able to seek rents under technology 
differentiation because their information advantage increases. There is clear empirical evidence, for 
example, that the technology-specific rates under the German feed-in tariffs have been driven by 
interventions from business groups as well as from the subnational administrations of the German 
Länder (Hoppmann et al. 2014; Sühlsen and Hisschemöller 2014; Vossler 2014; Strunz et al. 2015). 
Against this backdrop, Helm (2010) argues that there is a “premium to simplicity”. Technology-
neutral policies should, the argument goes, be preferred over technology-specific ones as they are 
harder to capture. However, this recommendation may hardly be instructive for practical policy-
making. As Strunz et al. (2015) point out, all types of policies are likely to be eroded by the influence 
of political interest groups – even those which are meant to be technology-neutral in the first place. 
This has become obvious for carbon emissions trading in the EU ETS where the alleged textbook 
simplicity has in part vanished during the implementation process (see, e.g., Anger et al. 2008; 
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Rudolph 2009; Spash 2010). This insight is eventually also confirmed by Helm (2010), who reports 
that due to lobbying efforts technology-specific bands were introduced for the originally technology-
neutral concept of UK’s renewable obligation certificates.  
4.3 Hazards of Picking Winners 
In the presence of asymmetric information and politico-economic constraints, it is sometimes argued 
that technology-specific RES-E support runs the risk of picking the wrong winners (e.g., 
Monopolkommission 2013). This concern is based on the assumption that specific support for a 
selected set of RES-E technologies will create path dependencies and impair the development and 
production of other technological options, which may be emerging but are not yet known to or 
accepted by regulators (Kverndokk et al. 2004, , see also Section 3.3). This effect is aggravated by the 
fact that (technology-specific) RES-E policies may not be easy to revise, modify or abolish even if new 
information about new emerging technologies becomes available to the regulator. Reasons include 
institutional path dependencies and politico-economic barriers (Strunz et al. 2015). Nordensvärd and 
Urban (2015) testify a feed-in tariff lock-in for the German wind power sector, and Kverndokk and 
Rosendahl (2007) show that the cost of picking the wrong winners among RES-E technologies may be 
substantial. 
These insights raise questions about whether and to what extent the alternatives to technology-
specific RES-E support reduce the hazards of picking winners. In this respect, Aghion et al. (2009) 
emphasize that “[i]n a fundamental sense these hazards are inescapable” (p. 689) – and also that 
there is remarkably little evidence on whether governments are better or worse than firms at picking 
winners. Technology-neutral RES-E support schemes leave the technology choices to the market. 
However, this tends to create a situation where the currently most competitive technologies are 
adopted, such as onshore wind power. However, this is not necessarily cost-effective in the long run 
as the cost advantages of established RES-E technologies may at least partly be due to unexploited 
learning effects for the emerging technologies as well as path dependencies. These distortions risk 
being perpetuated into the future under technology-neutral support schemes. In Section 3.3, we 
showed that in this case technology-specific support schemes may in fact be warranted to avoid only 
the close-to-commercial RES-E technologies to be picked.  
In the face of the ambiguities as to how to design RES-E support, one might be tempted to abstain 
from RES-E subsidies at all – and rather rely on the even more technology-neutral policy tool of 
carbon trading only. However, Kverndokk and Rosendahl (2007) demonstrate that this is not a 
dominant strategy either: without explicit subsidies to clean technologies existing market failures 
next to the carbon externality cannot be addressed cost-effectively (see also, Fischer and Newell 
2008). Technology development and deployment would be distorted in favor of established non-
renewable technologies – and even more so if the carbon trading scheme is improperly designed and 
the external costs of non-renewable generation are not fully internalized. The resulting excess cost 
may more than outweigh the potential risk of picking the wrong technologies by a technology 
subsidy.  
Consequently, the real issue in designing RES-E support schemes is not how to avoid picking winners 
– as this is likely to happen under any scheme – but “to be picky on your picks” when designing 
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technology-specific subsidies (Grubler et al. 2012, , p. 1708). In addition, and as was noted above, 
decision-making under uncertainty also implies a portfolio approach to RES-E support rather than an 
extreme picking-the-winner policy – but with technology-specific support levels. 
5 Conclusion 
Technology-specific RES-E support schemes, which differentiate subsidy rates between RES-E 
technologies, are ubiquitous in the EU and beyond. A frequent critique of this kind of policy is that 
compared to a technology-neutral RES-E support scheme it generates an excess cost of reaching a 
given RES-E deployment target. In this paper, we have addressed the conditions under which 
technology-specific RES-E support schemes may nevertheless provide benefits in terms of cost-
effectiveness. Rationales may be related to market failures associated with technological 
development as well as additional external costs, both of which drive a wedge between private and 
social costs of RES-E deployment. The degree and the empirical relevance of these market failures 
are typically heterogeneous across different RES-E technologies. Technological differentiation of RES-
E support schemes may be a regulatory response to this heterogeneity. Certainly, this policy 
approach will be only second-best in most cases – but it may be a reasonable policy pathway if other 
(first-best) policy solutions need to be ruled out. 
Of course, we are not arguing that technology-specific RES-E support increases cost-effectiveness by 
definition. Assessing cost-effective technology-specific RES-E subsidy rates is a challenging task as an 
aggregated assessment of all potential rationales is necessary and corresponding trade-offs need to 
be considered (such assessment would be beyond the scope of our analysis). Moreover, policy-
makers may fail to design technology-specific RES-E subsidies properly if they lack information and/or 
are driven by politico-economic considerations.  
These constraints notwithstanding, it is the main message of our paper that an unambiguous plea for 
technology-neutral RES-E policies cannot be justified on economic grounds either. In the presence of 
uncorrected market failures, this approach may distort technology choices and impair the cost-
effectiveness of attaining in particular long-term RES-E deployment targets. This is even more so as 
technology-neutral RES-E support schemes may be subject to government failure as are technology-
specific approaches. Our analysis thus suggests that there are no simple answers to the question how 
to design RES-E support schemes, or technology policies in general, in a cost-effective manner. 
In the end the discussion on the cost-effectiveness of technology-neutral versus technology-specific 
RES-E support schemes is related to the debate on economic rationales for supporting RES-E in the 
first place. This boils down to the notion that a RES-E target cannot be a desirable goal in itself; it 
must be logically derivable by analysis of more basic motives and of the relevant costs and 
constraints. Our key point is that almost regardless of which these motives are, there is generally a 
stronger case to be made for technology differentiation compared to technology neutrality. 
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